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Abstract 
What makes us experience artworks and their aesthetic properties? Can all aesthetic 
properties be found in all artworks? What aesthetic qualities are required to evaluate 
artworks? How do we differentiate between aesthetic and artistic values and is 
there any relationship between the two? This paper aims to answer these questions 
by examining influential arguments mainly about aesthetic concepts introduced 
by Frank Sibley and which were later developed by several other contemporary 
aestheticians including Robert Stecker, Peter Lamarque and Jerrold Levinson.
This paper briefly glances at the historical development of aesthetic properties, 
from Classical to contemporary times. To avoid speculation and vagueness, the paper 
proceeds to define some of the aesthetic properties as opposed to non-aesthetic 
ones and applies them to different literary and visual artworks. Such aesthetic 
qualities are attributed to a particular experience especially when considering 
literary works. This aesthetic experience, which includes mainly pleasure, plays an 
important role in the process of judging and evaluating art. It can also lead to several 
non-aesthetic values such as the cognitive value which is discussed in this paper. 
All these conceptions are open to perennial discussion. However, one cannot deny 
that there is a close connection between the aesthetic and the artistic value which 
do not exclude one another, especially in the process of identifying and evaluating 
artworks.
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Introduction
When a work of art is produced, it must stand on its own regardless of the 
conditions in which it was created. This means that to assess its aesthetic nature, 
the circumstances of the work’s origin such as the artist’s intentions, when and 
where it was created, are not important. Such aspects do not contribute to aesthetic 
judgements. Works of art are what they are and this separation is quite sharp. On the 
one hand, artworks have their histories and on the other, one can look at works of art 
as simple objects with various properties which are perceptual - audible properties 
2especially when speaking about music, visual properties in painting and sculpture, 
and communicative qualities when it comes to language. Such perceptual properties 
can be both aesthetic and non-aesthetic, for example the pity and sorrow of an elegy 
twinned with its metre and rhyme. According to Walton, ‘aesthetic properties are 
features or characteristics of works of art just as much as non-aesthetic ones. They 
are in the works, to be seen, heard, or otherwise perceived there.’ (2004, p.142-3) 
Walton continues to argue that facts about the artwork’s history can be important 
for aesthetic judgements. Therefore, it would be misleading to claim that a work of 
art can be simply judged for what can be perceived in it although the idea of judging 
from the aesthetic viewpoint only can prove to be also right.
For the purposes of this paper, I am going to limit myself only to aesthetic 
properties. However, reference will also be made to non-aesthetic properties by 
which I mean the technical aspect of a work of art such as colours, descriptions and 
rhyme. (Sedivy, 2018) At this point, you must be wondering about which artistic 
properties can be aesthetic. Most aestheticians agree that perception plays a 
crucial role in defining aesthetic properties. However, such properties are not only 
perceptual. As Kivy suggests, ‘the core aesthetic properties… are objects of the 
external senses, principally, but not exclusively, the senses of sight and hearing. 
And many of those aesthetic qualities that are not perceptual can… be seen to be 
derivative… on them.’ (2011, p.345) Kivy seems to be avoiding the use of the term 
‘metaphorical.’ Aesthetic qualities are crucial when one is evaluating an artwork 
because they can guide the observer towards its artistic value.  
Towards a definition and identification of aesthetic properties
The discussion about aesthetic properties can go on and on without ever reaching 
a definite conclusion. The reason is that the fundamental concepts which are 
involved when judging or evaluating artworks are psychological. This means that 
the aesthetic experience has to do with states of mind. Iseminger identifies two 
concepts in such a process. In his chapter entitled ‘Aesthetic Experience’, he refers to 
the phenomenological concept of aesthetic experience which transmits the feeling 
of what it is like to go through such a feeling. This concept was discussed by early 
twentieth-century aestheticians such as Clive Bell and John Dewey but later on, it 
was dismissed as such theory was not suitable enough to evaluate any artwork. 
As a result, aestheticians had to develop other related ideas. The second concept 
is the epistemic perspective of aesthetic experience which according to Iseminger, 
‘is a conception of a non-inferential way of coming to know something… which 
deserves to be thought of as aesthetic.’ (as cited by Levinson, 2003, p.100) This view 
seems to be more feasible as recent theories tend to defend the notion of aesthetic 
experience within this tradition. Beardsley himself, one of the main exponents of 
aesthetic tradition of the later-half of the twentieth century, began to follow the 
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evolved in the direction of the epistemic claim after Dickie criticized strongly the 
phenomenological view.
Accounts of what is distinctive about the aesthetic attitude and experience 
continued to be elaborated especially from the cognitive viewpoint. Scruton 
believed that imaginative thought was important for aesthetic experience which 
forms conceptions of objects. An object, which in this case can be either an artwork 
or a natural object or phenomenon, must be consciously conceived, otherwise it will 
lack aesthetic satisfaction. Levinson developed Scruton’s theory by stating that the 
cognitive aspect must be central to aesthetic pleasure. This happens when pleasure 
‘is grounded in a perception of and reflection on the object’s individual character and 
content.’ (Levinson, 2003, p.11) Such a theory implies that the climax of aesthetic 
appreciation of an artwork lies within the relation between its perceivable form and 
its resultant character and content.
Actually, it was Frank Sibley who further developed this relation of qualities in 
his essay ‘Aesthetic Concepts’. He claims that the observer’s sensitivity is extremely 
important. When looking at a particular painting, the observer might comment on 
the shades of colours or on the scenery or figures. Such non-aesthetic qualities 
which any observer can visualize in a painting, can become the basic references 
of aesthetic qualities if observed by an individual with a developed sense of taste 
because they can go beyond the painting itself and perceive what is not actually 
represented in the picture, for example a sense of serenity. Therefore, aesthetic 
concepts require taste or sensibility in a much higher degree than normal so that 
they can be applied correctly. Moreover, Sibley believes that aesthetic concepts are 
‘non-condition-governed’ in that ‘there are no non-aesthetic features which serve 
in any circumstances as logically sufficient conditions for applying aesthetic… terms.’ 
(2004, p.128)
I fully agree with Sibley’s belief that aesthetic judgements require taste, 
perception or sensitivity. On the other hand, I have my doubts about his statement 
about aesthetic qualities which are not governed by any condition. In fact, I do not 
attach much importance to this matter. It is more necessary to establish whether 
aesthetic properties are perceptual or not so that artworks can be more appreciated 
and valued. 
Sibley, who fully supports the epistemic view of aesthetic experience, emphasizes 
the fact that to reach aesthetic enjoyment, appreciation and judgement of artworks, 
one has to perceive the artwork for themselves. This can happen at once or after 
several readings, viewings or hearings or by the help of critics. Ultimately they have 
to be involved when they feel the power of a novel or see the unity of a work or 
notice a particular colour scheme. Sibley believes that to learn from others about 
such sensibility is not enough to value artworks. It is the observer him/herself 
who has to be struck by these qualities as perception cannot be transferred from 
an individual to another. Perception helps the individual to reach aesthetic value 
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aesthetic judgement.
Sibley’s theory has two important aspects. The first one is the epistemic aspect 
which highlights specific features in an artwork through its direct experience, that is 
by perceiving it directly. This brings to mind Kant’s claim in his Critique of Judgement 
when he stated that ‘People wish to subject the object to their own eyes…’ (2007, 
p.50). Since I have already referred to this epistemic claim, I am going to discuss the 
other aspect of Sibley’s theory which in my view, can be referred to as the ontological 
aspect. This aspect emphasizes the aesthetic experience one goes through when 
defining aesthetic properties. The fact that direct perceptual acquaintance is 
needed to appreciate and enjoy aesthetic properties is uncontroversial. But here, 
Sibley is stating that aesthetic properties are perceptual properties. It is actually this 
statement which concerns me and which brings to my mind this two-fold question: 
Are aesthetic properties necessarily perceptual ones and what does a perceptual 
property mean? For example, in a poem, I can perceive the redness in the sky during 
sunset, I can perceive one’s point of view and I can also perceive the feeling of sorrow 
associated to the setting. This example demonstrates three different experiences of 
perception.
Undoubtedly the dominance of sight and hearing is evident in Sibley’s theory of 
aesthetic properties. This means that his interpretation of perception is to perceive 
through the five senses. Such a belief reminds me of Baumgarten’s Reflections on 
Poetry in which he distinguished between ‘to know’ and ‘to perceive’: the former has 
to do with the superior faculty of logic while the latter refers to the inferior faculty of 
perception (1954, p.78). At this point, I agree with both Peter Kivy as well as James 
Shelley when the latter wrote ‘Sibley does not claim here that aesthetic properties 
necessarily depend on ‘perceptual entities’ or ‘appearances’. His main point is 
merely that aesthetic properties are perceived.’ (2003, p.371) I understand here that 
by the term ‘perceived’, he means to experience through direct engagement with 
the artwork which involves one or more of the five senses.
Aesthetic experience
Similar to his contemporary aestheticians, Lamarque claims that while no one 
denies that art offers some kind of experience, the nature of that experience is a 
‘perennial controversy.’ (2009, p.19) While discussing the aesthetic experience of 
literature, he maintains that such an experience might take the form of detachment 
which does not help in the evaluation of literature. Lamarque seems to agree with 
Livingston who believed that aesthetic experience includes thought, imagination, 
perception and sensation. When it comes to literature, he argues that perceptual 
experience is not essential to literary value. This idea suggests that literature, 
especially poetry, goes beyond sensual perception. In order to attain the full 
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aesthetic properties such as the pleasant sounds of a poem when read aloud and 
its layout on the page, do not contribute much to its literary value. Hence, thought 
and imagination can make the experience stronger. But can thought and imagination 
be considered as aspects of aesthetic experience? Aesthetically speaking, such an 
experience is related to perception. However, when applied to literature which 
is the art of language, perception is not always conscious. As Lamarque claims, 
‘reading is not characterized by any particular feeling or sensation but there is a kind 
of ‘appreciation’ which draws attention to literary mechanisms similar to aesthetic 
experience.’ (2009, p.20)
Aesthetic properties are important for the aesthetic experience especially 
when considering literary works. Frank Sibley listed a number of concepts such 
as balance, serenity, unity, vividness and so on, which he considered as aesthetic 
aspects of artworks including literary works. When analysing such concepts, it 
becomes clear that aesthetics is not only about beauty but that it goes beyond this 
conception. Talking about beauty nowadays is quite outdated. Sibley shows that 
aesthetic qualities are not always relevant to evaluate artworks. However, they 
can lead to several effects such as the particular appearance of a work, its salient 
features, the impact it leaves and what features merit aesthetic attention. These 
aesthetic descriptions interact with the aesthetic qualities. In the literary context, 
these qualities become more evident and they surpass mere sensory perception. As 
Lamarque suggests, ‘[a] mere grasp of the language is not sufficient to appreciate 
a work aesthetically.’ (2009, p.20) I agree with this statement because the reader 
must go beyond his linguistic competence, implying that literary appreciation needs 
‘a trained mode of discernment.’ (2009, p.21) This means that the reader is involved 
in the literary work’s unity, its quality and its achievement.
Sibley seems to draw a clear line between aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties 
with no relation between them whatsoever. According to him, non-aesthetic 
properties, whether they are structural, grammatical or physical, stand on their 
own without any dependence on the aesthetic ones. Keeping in mind that Kivy has 
challenged strongly the idea that aesthetic properties are not condition-governed, 
in literature, aesthetic features cannot be found in textual mechanisms only. For 
example, we cannot conclude that a poem is effective and moving simply because 
we can identify a number of metaphors, repetition, imagery and rhyme patterns. 
Moreover, these non-aesthetic qualities are not proof enough that the work is 
literary. The artistic or literary status of a work does not depend on its appearance.
In the literary context, there is no general rule which links linguistic features such 
as syntax or meanings to literary aesthetic achievement. A mechanism that is suitable 
for a particular novel may not function well in another. This means that aesthetic 
judgements cannot be generalized. It is wrong to claim that the aesthetic properties 
of literary works relate closely to formal features. An aesthetic approach does not 
depend on formalism. Literary works are not an end in themselves a means to some 
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features… They acquire aesthetic significance only when assigned a function within 
an artistic structure.’ (2009, p.22) Therefore, any formal or rhetorical devices do not 
possess intrinsic aesthetic value. However, they do contribute to a particular end. 
Such mechanisms may be also found in non-literary texts such as texts containing 
information. The end-result of these devices is different as in this case, they do not 
produce aesthetic pleasure. Textual features alone do not lead to appreciation, 
but their effect and inter-relationship within a literary context can conduct to the 
evaluation of literature.
Artistic Value
According to Ingarden (1987), 
artistic value… is something which arises in the work of art itself and has its 
essential ground in that. Aesthetic value is something which manifests itself 
only in the aesthetic object and as a particular moment which determines 
the character of the whole’ (p.14). 
One can deduce from Ingarden’s statement that there exists an interdependence 
between the value of art and aesthetic value. In fact, Stecker agrees with this idea 
when he rejects the theory of formalism, claiming that besides being out-dated, it is 
inadequate as it fails to specify the aesthetic value of art. (2003, p.312) He states that 
aesthetic value helps to identify artistic value and that there are three different ways 
to do so which include (i) the aesthetic properties of an artwork, (ii) the aesthetic 
experience which the artwork provides and (iii) the characteristic pleasure which is 
derived from the work itself. The last two characteristics go together as an aesthetic 
experience is typically pleasurable. Also such an experience is derived from a close 
observation of the artwork.
It seems that the essentialist conception identifies artistic value with aesthetic 
value. Lamarque and Olsen introduced the idea of appreciating literature as 
literature when the reader goes through a stance in search of a certain kind of value. 
However, it is not clear that all artforms can be defined by this theory. We must be 
aware that art is not replaceable. Therefore, we need to interpret the artistic value 
in the unique experience art can offer. This is the reason why artistic value is closely 
related to aesthetic experience. On the other hand, it is undeniable that art can be 
valuable in a non-aesthetic way because art can possess a significant cognitive value. 
Stecker summed up this idea very clearly when he stated that ‘art is instrumentally 
valuable beyond the provision of experience valued for its own sake.’ (2003, p.315) 
Hayman and Budd do not agree with Stecker as they believe that art is unable to do 
this or is unreliable to do this. Their conclusion is obvious: artistic value must be only 
limited to the aesthetic.
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Actually, cognitive value is a non-aesthetic value. A number of aestheticians such 
as Collingwood, Danto and Goodman, are in favour of art having some sort of 
cognitive value, whether direct or indirect. Cognitive value may include different 
ways of thinking, imagining or perceiving. All these are intellectual benefits which 
help the observer form concepts which are related to an experience of the artwork. 
For example, experiencing a particular emotion on reading a poem can help the 
reader identify certain emotions which of which they were not aware, thus leading 
to new self-knowledge.
If art is capable to transmit knowledge which forms a conception, this may mean 
that in reality this concept can be either true or false. This claim can be doubtful 
for a number of reasons. The first one is about the evidence art can provide to 
demonstrate that its concepts are true. If art cannot provide such evidence, then 
it cannot communicate knowledge. According to Stecker, ‘the cognitive value of 
art lies in providing new ways of thinking or perceiving or bringing home to us the 
significance of already familiar ways.’ (2003, p.316-7) Secondly, where should one 
search for artistic value? The concepts presented by a work may eventually result 
in either familiar truths or obvious falsehoods. Emphasizing too much on truth 
and falsehood is wrong because artworks cannot be reduced to simple morals. 
Artworks tend to present particular situations and characters. But to contribute to 
the search for knowledge, they must present sufficient generality that goes beyond 
the artworks themselves. The final reason is about the topic of replaceability as 
mentioned previously. Can we acquire knowledge from other ways than art? If the 
answer is in the affirmative, it means that art is not indispensable. Keeping in mind 
that what we appreciate is so closely related to the experience of the work and its 
mode of expression, the artistic value in this case, is irreplaceable as is its aesthetic 
value. 
Final Remarks
As Alcaraz León states, there is no common factor which can properly demonstrate 
that aesthetic merits always contribute to moral or cognitive values (2018, p.25). 
However, it is quite reasonable to say that many artworks possess cognitive value, 
whether direct or indirect. Moreover, this value forms an essential part of the 
artwork both from the creator’s point of view and from that of the audience. At this 
point one has to be careful not to identify a work’s artistic value with its cognitive 
one. A case in point are musical compositions. If some of these works have cognitive 
value, for sure this could hardly be their most important value. Stecker states that 
‘we have no reason to dismiss aesthetic value as part of artistic value.’ (2003, p.317) 
This statement implies that not all artworks can possess both kinds of value and 
also that the topic of artistic value has not yet been exhausted because there are 
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response of the audience to a particular work or, from the historical perspective, 
the work’s contribution to the development of art, which can result in a particular 
form or genre. Such concepts of artistic value are pluralistic and go much beyond the 
essentialist conception. Artistic value is valuable in an artwork if such a possession 
leads to the artistic value of the work itself. This idea helps in distinguishing artistic 
value from non-artistic value. Such a distinction can also be reached when, in the 
process of identifying art, one also identifies artistic value.
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